

CIA Trained Europeans In Hope of '56 Uprisings

By David C. Martin
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The Central Intelligence Agency trained Eastern Europeans for intervention in national uprisings it hoped would be triggered by the agency's release of Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 speech denouncing Stalin, a former high agency official said yesterday.

James J. Angleton, former head of counterintelligence for the CIA, said the agency began training hundreds of volunteers after one of his operatives obtained a copy of Khrushchev's secret speech before the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party at which Stalin was officially denounced for the first time.

The Eastern Europeans, mostly from Hungary, Poland and Romania, were trained in paramilitary operations at secret agency installations in Europe, Angleton said.

The strategy was to keep the speech secret until the training was completed and then release it, anticipating it would provoke national uprisings which could be aided by the CIA volunteers, Angleton added.

The speech was published in The New York Times in June, 1956, with the approval of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, CIA director Allen Dulles, Angleton said.

Angleton contended the speech was released prematurely, sparking nationalist uprisings in Poland, Hungary and Romania before the CIA volunteers were ready to participate.

He disputed an account given in a recent book by Ray S. Cline, another former high-ranking CIA official.

Cline said the agency had paid "a very handsome price" for a copy of the speech, but Angleton insisted "there was no payment."

The document was provided to the CIA for purely ideological reasons, Angleton maintained. Cline's role was

to verify the authenticity of the document, Angleton said.

In his book, "Secrets, Spies and Scholars," Cline said he had argued for publication of the speech because it would expose "the spectacle of a totalitarian nation indicted by its own leadership."

Angleton said he and the late Frank G. Wisner, then director of clandestine services, opposed publication until the CIA had time to exploit its value by training the covert paramilitary forces.

At one point, George F. Kennan, a retired foreign service officer and an expert in Soviet affairs, was consulted without being told about the secret volunteers. Kennan replied that the advantages to be gained by keeping the document secret would enable the United States to use it to exploit splits within the Communist bloc.

"There were many talks about what to do," Angleton said.

Angleton resigned from the CIA in December, 1974. Cline was the agency's deputy director for intelligence during the 1960s.